The article explores some of the assumptions behind the current valence of the notion of trust and in particular its entanglement in discourses of social robustness, the management and reporting of (corporate) knowledge, and its underlying culture and systems of responsibility. It unfolds by contrasting classic and contemporary anthropological work on cultures of suspicion, culpability and spiritual ambiguity with the new vocabulary of capitalist corporate ethics. Finally, the argument examines the work that relationships do when moving in and out of the occult, and contrasts it with the kind of temporal work that capitalism demands from relationships to remain diaphanous. If public trust functions as the political epistemology of neoliberal society, an anthropological theory of trust ought perhaps to reaffirm instead our trust in anthropological theory and comparison.
A parallel development of the crisis in trust is the rise of knowledge and risk management industries (Power 2004) . Because trust and social crises are presented as natural enemies, the former rushing out when the latter draw in, social robustness has been equated to a kind of omniscience, the capacity to know everything, in particular future events. Robust knowledge, of the kind that can be trusted, is therefore knowledge that is socially aware of itself (Strathern 2005) . Such knowledge is not always easy to track, unless, of course, it can become self-evident, which is to say self-deliverable. The problem of (the sociology of) knowledge becomes thus one of tele-communication: how to bridge the distance between the happening and the cognizance of knowledge. As it turns out, the market is the paradigmatic provider of self-deliverable knowledge (where the happening and the cognizance coincide), because in the marketplace knowledge is delivered as it takes shape (in the form of market signals). The founding father of this epistemological economy was Friedrich Hayek, for whom the 'division of knowledge', that is, the distance between knowledge-happening and knowledge-awareness, was the fundamental problem of our time, 'analogous to, and at least as important as, the problem of the division of labour.' (Hayek 1937: 49) This article explores some of the assumptions behind the current valence of the notion of trust and in particular its entanglement in discourses of social robustness, the management and reporting (i.e. tele-communication) of knowledge, and its underlying culture and systems of responsibility. I am interested in how knowledge, responsibility and social relationality have been organised as epistemologically distanced objects in contemporary capitalist regimes of audit and trust-making: objects liable of separation (moral crises) and mutual convergence (political ethics). Trust figures thus in this context as an engine of epistemic distance-compression: where knowledge, responsibility and mutuality collapse into an identical social form.
I do not see the article, however, as making a contribution to the growing sociological literature on trust (e.g. Braithwaite and Levi 2003; Cook 2003; Luhmann 1979; Misztal 1996; Seligman 1997; Sztompka 1999 ). The argument is not about trust itself but about the kind of theory that we need to resist the temptations of a sociology of trust. A theory that looks for the role of trust in social relationships takes for granted Hayek's presuppositions about the 'division of knowledge': it takes for granted that divisions between knowledge and the world are trust-distances to be traversed and abridged.
There is no particular reason, however, why an anthropology of trust should work as a theory of public epistemology.
Indeed much of the new literature on trust simply recasts our sociological tradition by rewriting the canon using trust as the organizing category. We have accounts of trust as a form of moral commitment, a character disposition, or a dynamic of 'encapsulated interests', where trust emerges as a mutual co-implication of interests on all transacting parties. These conceptions turn on a notion of trust as a 'cognitive category' because 'all depend on assessments of the trustworthiness of the potentially trusted person.' (Hardin 2006: 17) Trust emerges as an epiphenomenon of social knowledge: what people's relationships look like after the fact of cognitive re-appraisals. But this, unfortunately, will not do. As mysterious as the concept of trust may be (cf. Möllering 2001) , the question today is not what trust is but what kind of work the notion does. There is more to trust that its relation to cognitive and knowledge structures. Trust may be 'encapsulated' in reciprocal expectations (Hardin 2006) but it is also distributed in a variety of human and nonhuman forms; it is as much a cognitive category as it is a material one; indeed, it belongs to the realm of the intersubjective in as much as it belongs to the interobjective. It is as much an anthropological object (of theory) as an object of social knowledge. The question of trust therefore calls for a kind of theory that elucidates not its place in the sustenance of (robust / social) knowledge but its very qualities as an anthropological concept.
To this effect, here I take a closer look at the role that trust plays in contemporary corporate ethics discourses. I focus in particular on one well-known and influential theory of corporate public trust, and compare it with anthropological interest in the allocation of responsibility, what Mary Douglas termed 'forensic theories of danger' (Douglas 1992: 5) : how risk, sin, misfortune or blame are distributed across society.
Here some relationships are cast as being outside 'reality', for they play out in the order of the occult, which has its own temporality. I then move on to examine the work that relationships do when moving in and out of the occult, and contrast various anthropological accounts with the kind of temporal work that capitalism demands from relationships to remain diaphanous. Whereas anthropological theories of responsibility focus on the exigent work that relationships need to do to remain reversible (to move in and out of the occult), the new culture of (corporate) ethics has only one version of the 'reality' of relationships: relationships that are real and robust because they are transparent, instantaneous and point to no context but themselves. If social and political theory has called upon trust as a placeholder for robust public knowledge and prudential political choice, an anthropological theory of trust should reaffirm instead the trustworthiness of anthropological comparison.
Responsible analogues
Every aircraft in the world would be grounded if air traffic control relied on the same type of system that companies use today to report their information. Air traffic controllers must receive vast amounts of highly technical, constantly changing information reported to them quickly in a format they can understand and use immediately, and they must have absolute trust that the information is complete and accurate every time. Imagine the consequences if those controllers could only get their information from an observer on the ground who scribbled a few notes, printed them on an old-fashioned press, and mailed the information to the control tower once a quarter? (DiPiazza Jr. and Eccles 2002: 129) Technology, complete and accurate information, and trust. DiPiazza and Eccles' triangulation of concepts echoes an observation made by Max Gluckman over thirty years ago in an essay on magical and secular solutions to moral crises. Commenting on why certain African societies resorted to divination to understand moral uncertainties, Gluckman noted that a possible answer might lie in 'the limits of their technical knowledge.' These societies have 'much less knowledge of the empirical causes of misfortune and good fortune, present and past. They also have less surety about the future.' (Gluckman 1972: 4) Knowledge, Gluckman was implying, works in a temporal register (past, present, future), a reliance itself dependent upon moral qualities.
Gluckman's observation tied in with the classical anthropological literature on cultures of suspicion and blame in Africa, of which Evans-Pritchard's work on the Azande was the precursor (Evans-Pritchard 1937) . In revisiting this tradition, Gluckman wanted to understand what makes responsibility tick: on what bases do people make themselves accountable to, or demand accountability from others. Many are the idioms and channels, but Gluckman focused on one: the occult. The occult works in ways that are hidden, but not invisible. Azande witches, for example, are known to have a black substance in their intestines, which can be seen after an autopsy. The substance is innocuous unless activated by vicious feelings. Only then is witchcraft set to work.
Witchcraft is inherited in the patrilineal line, which is why men are not held accountable for possessing this power. Responsibility lies not in the person, but in her actions towards others. By unconcealing the work of the occult, Azande thus displace responsibility away from individuated persons and unto systems of moral adjudication.
They blame not people but (particular kinds of) relationships.
Gluckman's essay concludes by noting how magical and secular solutions to moral crises ultimately differ in the distribution and attribution of responsibility. Whilst African tribal societies use the idiom of the occult to make the moral agency of the whole group visible to itself, Western societies, he argued, create structural differences within the group, to the point where responsibility is dissipated across the social whole (Gluckman 1972: 41) . The occult, one would say, is self-eclipsed, hidden within its own dissipation. It is not a permanent place but a strategy variously deployed to create unities and bifurcations within and between groups. So whereas African societies aggrandize their sense of moral endowment, Euro-Americans try to do without a sense of moral agency altogether. Elucidation or (dis)closure of the occult thus makes the system of moral relations (dis)appear.
Gluckman's description of how Zande people invocate and set the notion of responsibility to work through relationships -through, say, idioms of patrilineal inheritance, women's fertility or male competition for resources -contrasts with DiPiazza and Eccles' description of the accountability of air traffic controllers, which is said to depend exclusively on the availability of information. Robust information makes the system morally robust, that is, trustworthy. Poor information, on the other hand, flaws the system, because it prevents proper reporting and exposes air traffic controllers to perils not of their own making. Morality emerges thus not as an aspect of human relationships but as a feature of the infrastructure of information. If we make our information more robust, we strengthen our morality.
I noted above that the occult works in ways that are hidden though not invisible. Today the Information Age has produced its own veil of visibility-obsessed discourses, of which the rhetoric of 'transparency' is perhaps the most famous (Strathern 2000b; Tsoukas 1997) . 'Information' and 'transparency' emerge as complementary analogues in our turn-of-the-century fascination with the institutionalisation of trust (cf. Braithwaite and Levi 2003) . DiPiazza and Eccles' manifesto for building a culture of public trust in corporations and capital markets draws out the basic discursive economy informing this vision. Here trust and information/communication are being hailed as two sides of the same coin, namely, moral robustness. What follows is my reading of all such suggestions for revamping the infrastructure of the information economy around the idea of a kind of information that is morally self-sufficient and trustworthy (e.g. Galford and Drapeau 2003; Handy 1995; Joni 2004 ).
Reporting
Trust, DiPiazza and Eccles' tell us, is not a complex affair: 'some things are simple and always will be simple. The effectiveness of the world's capital markets depends on public trust, and trust depends on the timely availability of complete, relevant, and reliable information -in a word, it depends on appropriate levels of transparency.' (DiPiazza Jr. and Eccles 2002: vi, emphasis the Turnbull guidance on Internal Control, the Smith guidance on Audit Committees, and various pieces of good practice guidance from the Higgs report. DiPiazza and Eccles' work is written in the spirit of these reforms. Central to the consolidation of an information economy, they argue, is the building of a robust architecture through which information must flow. They call their own framework the Corporate Reporting Supply Chain (CRSP). CRSP identifies the actors who at some point will get their hands on corporate information. These include a company's executives, its board of directors, independent auditors, information distributors, third-party analysts, investors and other stakeholders. An anthropologist would say that CRSC invokes an image of distributed agency: responsibility is at once located and distributed. There is however a particular direction to the way information is here being distributed, which is given away by the notion of 'reporting'. The term is illuminating because it suggests that information is always gathered for external consumption. The corporation keeps 'externalising' itselfemptying itself out for others. This is also why DiPiazza and Eccles define 'transparency' as making available information that investors would want (DiPiazza Jr.
and Eccles 2002: 4).
Reporting information is not as easy as it sounds, however. DiPiazza and Eccles observe that in the corporate world there are at least three orders of reality wherein information takes shape. The orders add up to form what they call the 'Three-tier model of corporate transparency' (DiPiazza Jr. and Eccles 2002: 14) , and note that it is imperative to develop standards to certify the robustness of information for each and every one of these orders. The three tiers are: (i) global generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP); (ii) industry-specific information, and; (iii) company-specific information.
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles are used worldwide, in various guises as national or international standards, to come up with a figure of value for a company's financial record and performance. Critiques of GAAP abound, and it is not my concern here to summarize nor explore them in detail. Suffice to say that an important limitation to information yielded by GAAP is the premium it places on a particular temporal register. Different accounting principles use different temporal horizons to evaluate assets: some value assets at historical cost, some at market value. The issue is important because it shows that the orders that are invoked to determine where one ought to look for information are not simply institutional (i.e. accounting standards, industry and/or company contexts) but ultimately holographic (Strathern 1995: 17) : a company that favours a historical evaluation of its assets purposely defines the nature of its intangible relation to itself (through time) in terms very different to those of a company that opts for a current market valuation. In each case, the tangible and the intangible are given expression in terms that evoke different conceptions of time, relations (to original cost, in the former; to the market, in the latter) and to the structure of the business (consolidated in the past or dispersed in the market). I return to the question of intangibility later.
Whilst real progress towards developing global accounting standards has already been made by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and the European Commission's approval in May 1999 of the Financial Services Action Plan, developing frameworks that will enable global comparability in Tiers II and III is far more difficult.
It is at this juncture that DiPiazza and Eccles' vision for the future of corporate reporting takes a new turn. Difficult as the development of these global comparable information frameworks may prove, it is imperative, they stress, that they do come into existence. In fact, they will be brought into life, if only because the market, sooner or later, will coerce them out: 'One of the facts of corporate life… is that if industries do not take the initiative to develop these standards, someone else will do so to meet the sound,' they write, 'all stakeholders will find them valuable and will exert pressure on other companies to report on that basis. The pressure will be applied either directly (by demanding the information) or indirectly (by not investing in the companies' stocks, not buying their products, protesting their labor practices, and so on).' (DiPiazza Jr. and Eccles 2002: 77) In other words, standards and information are mobilized to make globality and the market appear. My point here is not about the mercantilist orientation to the production of information that underlies DiPiazza and Eccle's vision. Instead I want to bring attention to the mode of argumentation that brings ideas about 'markets', 'information' and 'trust' to bear on one another, and to the kind of institutional economy that arises from such interfoldings. Take the case of environmentalism.
DiPiazza and Eccles cite a PricewaterhouseCoopers Management Barometer Survey which queried 157 U.S. executives about the 'real value drivers' behind their businesses. These should be the drivers that corporate reporting ought to focus on.
Lowest on the consultant's survey turned out to be 'community involvement and environmental performance'; highest, 'product and service quality'. They explain: 'U.S. companies in the aggregate -there are huge exceptions -have not had to confront a sustained environmental or community-focused protest or inquiry that chips away at a firm's pride and reputation.' (DiPiazza Jr. and Eccles 2002: 86) The fact that environmental performance has not yet been turned into a 'value driver' that markets coerce companies into reporting about shows the extent to which the notion of 'trust' is being deployed and moves in and out of different idioms (e.g. transparency, product and service quality, environmentalism) in order to redraw the line that separates the corporation from society. In this light, upholding an environmental agenda is not something that corporations do for society but what makes the corporation 'social' in the first place: a corporation that 'does' the environment is a socially responsible corporation. The perverse effect of this -and this is a point to which I return shortly -is that society is only seen to appear at certain points in corporations' self-representations.
More importantly, it shows that the current obsession with reporting and information is one such point of corporate social self-consciousness. In other words, information has become society's latest idiom for self-awareness, and an especially dangerous one at that, because the idiom allows for the re-description of moral ambivalences in what looks like neutral terms -hence the categorisation of environmentalism as an insignificant market value driver.
There is a further effect to this 'informationalisation' of (moral) knowledge. The capacity of information to cross scales also helps explain why it is that organizations image themselves internally on the processes that image them externally.
DiPiazza and Eccles provide an example:
The only way a company can know if it adequately meets the information needs of stakeholders is to ask them through surveys, for example, or direct dialogue. Parker 1998) . My interest here is in the latter. If information stands for society, then our informational base stands for our moral choices: We are our information, which is why our information needs to be unbiased, pure, elemental. It is at this point that DiPiazza and Eccles bring in the example of the air traffic controllers with which I opened the essay. Air traffic controllers must be assured that the information they receive is complete and accurate at all times. Paper-based information will not do the job, because it would take too long to compile and would take too much time to read and make sense of. This is why air traffic controllers do not use paperbased information. Paper-based information, they note, is 'opaque', it does not allow users to 'see through or beyond the format. Users get little or no help in analyzing and understanding a document's content or in verifying its accuracy and authenticity. That we live in a society where our relationship to the world is increasingly being redefined in terms of risks is of course something that commentators have been pointing out for quite some time now (e.g. Beck 1992; Giddens 1990 ). In the world of institutions, for instance, 'risk management' is the latest of these re-descriptive exercises (Power 2004). Notwithstanding, for Russell Hardin, the relationship between risk and trust is difficult to make sense of at the grand level of macrosociology; it does not make sense to talk about an increase in the importance of risk in our lives. When Islamic banking and insurance has exposed recent sociological analyses of risk for presuming a universally pervasive technical discourse of calculability, rationality and actuary, as if the management of risk and morality were truly incommensurable affairs.
As the case of Islamic insurance practices makes apparent, where mutuality and cooperation run at the heart of why people subscribe life insurance policies, the measurements taken by the actuary are always-already a moral technology (Maurer 2005: 151-152) . What follows aims to expand Maurer's insights by exploring the imbroglio of risk and the moralities of trust in a continuum of yet further entanglements.
Funds of trust
In her closing statement to the introductory essay in Risk and Blame, Douglas coins a turn of phrase that throws new light over the preceding discussion on corporate reporting and the self-description of transparent information. 'Blaming', she writes, 'is a way of manning the gates through which all information has to pass.' (Douglas 1992: 19) The image of blaming as a fund of information that circulates around society is an economic image. It is another way of saying that information is a blaming-resource used by society to reallocate its funds of responsibility. Economists would see this stretching of their discipline as a stretching of the imagination. But anthropologists would know otherwise. Anthropologists know Mauss.
Marcel Mauss' analytic on giving economies can be profitably applied to the study of the way modern capitalist society funds its trusts of responsibility. The study of huntergatherer societies has in fact benefited from this use of the Maussian framework for quite some time now (e.g. Bird-David 1990; Ingold 2000) . Tim Ingold, for example, has described hunter-gatherer's relationship to the environment as an economy of trust (Ingold 2000) . Unlike Euro-Americans, who objectify the environment as an alienated presence to their humanity, hunter-gatherers conceive of themselves as co-participants in a non-divisible social nature, along other forms of life such as spirits and animals.
One's relationship to the environment and its life-forces takes therefore the form of a mode of engagement rather than the exercise of power and control. In this light, hunting
is not seen as a coercive operation, an encroachment or intervention upon the alienated and objectified animal. As Ingold puts it, animals 'are not just 'there' for the hunter to find and take as he will: rather they present themselves to him.' (Ingold 2000: 71) Rather than an act of violence hunting is seen as a process of negotiation, one of the many forms that the 'sharing' of the environment between equal co-dwellers may take. Deceit does not end up with the death of the animal but is carried over into the time after the killing. A hunter will for instance try to avoid an attack from the animal's disappointed spirit by making a wooden miniature model of himself and painting it with blood from the dead animal. On leaving the hunting grounds, the hunter will leave the figure behind, in the hope that the spirit will think that the murderer is still around (Willerslev 2007: 129) .
Eclipsed in the economy of trust and sharing there is therefore an economy of deceit and deception. This is not to say that the principles and relationships of care and duty that Social relationships require different temporal registers to play out their potency in full.
Yukaghirs cannot just go and hunt elk. They need and take time to seduce the animal.
They require time to build up the corporeal and perspectival efficacy and trustworthiness that will coerce moose out from their Khozyain's pen. The requirement of temporality is perhaps surprising in light of the emphases that DiPiazza and Eccles' auditors place on real-time transactions and knowledge. Real-time knowledge fits of course with the paradigm of self-described information that DiPiazza and Eccles speak about. Both 'real-time' and 'self-described information' are ultimately and radically 'transparent', because they refer to no temporal or informational domain except their own. All information is forever present in its self-description, and all knowledge is forever tied up to its unique moment of revelation. Deleuze and Guattari have described capitalism's economy of immanence in similar terms: 'capitalism functions as an immanent axiomatic of decoded flows (of money, labor, products).' Such flows may be realized in a variety of modes (a democratic, dictatorial or totalitarian state), 'but they are nonetheless isomorphous with regard to the world market' (Deleuze and Guattari 1994 [1991] : 106). This is another way of saying that institutional life is being reorganized around the credibility of isolated value-episodes, such as data delivered in XBRL self-sustained format or transactions that are real enough because they happen now.
The institution that organizes itself around these dictums is in danger of institutionalising a 'dialytical' form of social organisation, one which keeps purifying itself by forever removing itself from its own conditions of existence. Dialytical organisations place no premium on intangibility: all things intangible need to be known, all occult relations brought to the fore. The fore is, of course, the market. I noted above that today companies have at their disposal competing accounting principles for evaluating their assets. Historical and market values are two such models, and it is perhaps no surprise that the latter are gaining currency. For whereas the former give value to intangible historical assets, the latter disperse value in the real-time, selfreferred information that are market prices. The kind of knowledge that obtains from linking-up market signals is of a very particular kind, not least because relationality in a market model tends to zero-out temporality from the substance of the intangible.
Conclusion
Herman Melville's wonderful novel, The Confidence-Man, makes a most suggestive reading in these times of financial meltdowns when capitalist society holds on display the very best of its ruinous condition. Melville's Confidence-Man was of course a parody of those cultures of masquerading that held trust as a moral currency when all around them stood nothing but a hall of mirrors for financial bubbles, shambles and scams -trust as an aspiration, a structure of hope, caught up in its own delusions.
Melville's portrayal of 19 th century American pragmatism, as Deleuze put it, exemplified the corruption of trust into a society of charity (Deleuze 2005 (Deleuze [1993 : 86-92).
A culture of masquerading is as good a title as any for the political economy of the contemporary sociology of trust. Indeed, an intriguing play of analogical conversions between the opaque and the diaphanous -of the visions, revisions and in-visions of the masquerade -appears to be at work in the New Corporate Ethics (corporate reporting, global governance, corporate social responsibility). Transparency, accountability and trust (diaphaneity) have been mobilized against the dark forces of secrecy, uncertainty and risk (opacity). The movement in and out of opacity and diaphaneity further works on a particular temporal thrust: the 'reality' of time, and thus the 'reality' of relationships. Real relationships are the epitome of ethical and trustworthy sociality because their value is self-evident: it is self-describable, radically visible (there is no premium on intangibility), and openly knowledgeable. Public trust as political epistemology (Corsín Jiménez 2010).
Real relationships, however, are sustained on a rather unreal, or at the very least unstable social structure: one that is characterised by a continuous emptying-out of relationships and that I have called 'dialysis'. Under conditions of dialysis, social knowledge is subjected to a constant externalisation of itself through its breaking down into ever narrower constituents. In this light, the notion of trust works as a 'dialytical' concept: a concept that requires to breakdown (or purify) its own context of action to convey meaning. Trust works by creating its own preconditions of existence, which must in turn be certified as trustworthy. Audit cultures are the classic example: the audit makes the culture trustworthy, which in turn holds trust as a value capable of audit (cf.
Power 1994).
Unlike the epistemological diaphaneity of the audit economy, the Yukaghirs hunting economy is both an economy of trust and an economy of mistrust; it is about sharing and about deceiving, about making relationships visible and invisible, all at once. I tried to capture this recursive movement of social knowledge in and out of its own analogical conversions by saying that social relationships amongst the Yukaghir were reversible.
Moving in and out of its own idioms of the visible and the occult, reversibility turns Annelise Riles' famous notion of the 'inside out' into an analytical aesthetic itself (Riles 2001). When trust becomes the relational idiom that traverses the distance between knowledge / public / the social, we might want to consider instead how to conceptualise the very movement in and out of such traversing. My suggestion here is that reversibility functions as an anthropological concept (of the concept) of relationality (Corsín Jiménez and Willerslev 2007) .
Reversibility is founded on knowledge's own knowledge of its instability and ambiguousness. The Yukaghirs do not hide this, which is why their social transactions constantly enfold motifs of hiddenness and trust unto themselves. Another way of saying this is that they manage the unity of their social world through the administration of its disunity or division. This is also the lesson that Gluckman urged us to draw from the African material. We need divisions and disruptions to know what unites and integrates. We need the occult to know why some things are worth making visible. We need a realm that lies after trust to make trust meaningful. There is, in a sense, no trust 
